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Abstract 
We investigate the impact of audit quality on earnings management (EM) of 8 oil marketing companies listed on 
the Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE) from 2004 to 2013.We focus on oil marketing companies because of the 
alleged large scale financial misrepresentations associated with the Nigerian oil sector. We expect a significant 
negative relationship between audit quality and EM which is represented by discretionary accruals estimated by 
the modified Jones Model.  We use audit firm size, auditor industry specialization and auditor tenure as proxies 
for audit quality. Contrary to expectations, our results reveal that both audit firm size and auditor industry 
specialization have negative but insignificant impact on EM of the sampled companies. We, however, find 
evidence of a significant negative impact of auditor tenure on EM which is consistent with our a priori 
expectations.  We  recommend  the removal of the restriction placed on the tenure of auditors to a maximum of 
nine consecutive years by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) because of its potential to constrain 
earnings management practices of Nigerian listed companies.   
Keywords: Audit Quality, Earnings Management,  Oil Marketing Companies, Nigeria.      
 
1.0 Introduction 
The oil and gas industry is one of the vital industries in the world, been a major source of energy  and provider of 
foreign exchange earnings to nation states endowed with the resources. The industry has distinctive features of 
been capital intensive, association with high level of risk and  uncertainty, and complexity in technical and 
operational set up (Faure & Wang, 2004 as cited by Samaila, 2014). The oil industry in Nigeria is classified into 
the upstream and the downstream sectors. The upstream sector is characterized by activities like acquisition of 
mineral rights in oil and gas, exploration, development, and production of oil and gas. The downstream sector 
engages in storage and transportation of oil, refining and hydro processing, marketing and distribution of oil, gas 
and its derivatives. 
The Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) is charged with the responsibility  of 
coordinating the activities of both sectors and ensuring that the finished petroleum products reach the final 
consumers. The oil marketing companies procure and transport refined petroleum products from NNPC depots 
or other marketers and sell such products through a network of stations, peddling trucks and vessels (Samaila, 
2014). Oil marketing companies are also involved in marketing of locally made and imported lubricants, 
insecticides, bitumen and other related petroleum products.  
The operations of the NNPC have been associated with allegations of fraudulent financial practices 
ranging from  unremitted  funds to the federation account to excessive expenditure of  oil proceeds. For instance, 
in the PriceWaterHouse report commissioned by the government (see Punch, February 5, 2015), cases of 
unremitted amounts and expenditure of about 40% of oil proceeds by the NNPC were reported. These financial 
scandals have been identified with oil marketing companies as well, exemplified  by the case of  African 
Petroleum plc (now Forte oil plc) where a credit facility of 24 billion naira was not disclosed in the financial 
statements (Samaila, 2014). The implication of accounting scandals of these nature is obvious- loss of public 
confidence in the financial reports of Nigerian companies generally and oil marketing companies in particular 
amidst fears that financial reporting fraud could be more pervasive than imagined among the oil marketing 
companies.   
One of the most important responsibilities of the managers of a firm is to provide financial reports and 
information used by current and potential investors, creditors and other potential users in making investment and 
financing decisions. These financial reports contain accounting earnings which different stakeholders use to 
evaluate the profitability of the firm, predict the future earnings and its related risks, and assess the performance 
of management of the reporting entity generally (Karimi & Gerayli, 2014). Given the importance of accounting 
earnings, managers sometimes use their discretion over the selection of accounting choices accorded them by 
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) to influence the amount of reported earnings with the intent 
of deriving personal benefits at the expense of other stakeholders. This manipulative behavior of managers is at 
best called earnings management and at worst tagged as financial statement fraud (FSF). Extant literature, 
therefore, associates earnings management with the deliberate altering of financial statements through the use of 
judgment in structuring transactions to either mislead the firm’s stakeholders about the true economic picture of 
the firm or to achieve some contractual benefit that is based on accounting numbers (Healy & Wahlen, 1999). 
The principal reasons for this obscure managerial behavour are traced to, amongst others, attempts to enhance 
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compensation bonus (Sun & Sun, 2007), beat analyst forecast (Comprix, Mills & Schimidt, 2007), and  attract 
favorable subscription during Initial Public Offerings (IPO) (Teoh, Wong & Rao, 1998). 
Literature suggests that one of the mechanisms believed to be effective in monitoring the opportunistic 
behavior of management is the quality of the external auditor, commonly called audit quality (DeAngelo, 1981). 
However, the last decade witnessed several accounting scandals and corporate failures that were blamed on 
earnings management practices of firms globally, which audit quality was not able to detect. The United States  
alone recorded ten largest bankruptcies in 2002, including the two largest in world history, namely WorldCom 
and Enron (Albrecht, Albrecht & Albrecht, 2004). In Nigeria, Cadbury Nig. Plc and African Petroleum are 
exemplar cases. The increasing incidence of corporate scandals or failures associated with earnings management 
has led to loss of public confidence in the quality of reported accounting earnings and the audit function 
generally. Accordingly, earnings management has become a matter of great concern to regulators, practitioners 
as well as accounting researchers (Okolie, 2014) due to the perverse consequences it has on corporate survival.   
This paper, therefore, seeks to investigate the effect  of audit quality on earnings management of  listed 
oil marketing companies in Nigeria. Specifically, we test the following null hypotheses related to the subject 
matter: (1) Audit firm size has no significant impact on earnings management of listed oil marketing companies 
in Nigeria, (2) Auditor industry specialization has no significant impact on earnings management of listed oil 
marketing companies in Nigeria, and (3) Auditor tenure  has no significant impact on earnings management of 
listed oil marketing companies in Nigeria. 
The remaining part of the paper is organized as follows: Section two reviews the related literature and 
theoretical framework for the study. Section three addresses methodological issues and specifies the model for 
the study. Section four presents and discusses the results of data analysis while section five provides the 
conclusion and recommendations.                       
 
2. Review of Related Literature  
2.1 The concepts of audit quality and earnings management 
Though audit quality is not a new concept in accounting literature, up till now it has no single universally 
accepted definition. The most widely used definition of audit quality is by DeAngelo (1981 p. 183) which states 
that “the quality of audit services is the market-assessed joint probability that a given auditor will both (a) 
discover a breach in the client’s accounting system, and (b) report the breach.” Other researchers associate audit 
quality with the reliability of financial statements information and adherence to generally accepted auditing 
standards (GAAS). Heralding the reliability of financial statements information arguments, Titman and Trueman 
(1986) posit that high quality external auditors enhance the accuracy of reported accounting information, 
suggesting that financial statements audited by high quality external auditors rarely contain material 
misstatements. Researchers who link audit quality to adherence to GAAS (see Bedard, Johnstone, &Smith, 
2010) argue that audit conducted in accordance with GAAS provides reasonable assurance that the audited 
financial statements and related disclosures are presented in accordance with generally accepted accounting 
principles (GAAP). 
Similarly, the accounting literature is yet to provide a universally accepted definition of the term 
“earnings management’’. Earnings management is defined differently by different researchers, depending on 
how they perceive it. Healy and Wahlen (1999) define earnings management as the altering of financial 
statements through the use of judgment in financial reporting and in structuring transactions to alter financial 
reports to either mislead some stakeholders about the underlying economic performance of the company or to 
influence contractual outcomes that depend on reported accounting numbers. In the words of Schipper (1989), 
earnings management involves ‘disclosure management’ in the sense of a purposeful intervention in the external 
financial reporting process, with a view to obtain private gain for shareholders or managers.  
 Fields, Lys, and Vincent (2001) are of the opinion that earnings management arises when managers 
exercise discretion over accounting numbers, with or without restrictions. The discretion is exercised to either 
maximize firm value (Shareholders wealth) or to maximize the selfish interest of managers (opportunistic 
earnings management). 
In another attempt to define earnings management, Dechow and Skinner (2000) classified earnings 
management into two broad groups: earnings management within GAAP and earnings management that violates 
GAAP. They termed earnings management that violates GAAP as fraudulent financial reporting. Fraud is 
defined as “ the intentional, deliberate misstatement or omission of material facts, or accounting data, which is 
misleading and, when considered with all other information made available would cause the reader to change or 
alter his or her judgment or decision” (The National Association of Certified Fraud Examiners, 1993, P.12). 
 
2.2  Theoretical framework 
The theoretical framework for this study is anchored on the agency theory and the stakeholder theory. The 
agency theory articulates principal –agent relationship between the shareholders and the managers with 
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managers acting as agents whose personal interest does not always cohere with the company and the shareholder 
interest (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). The separation of ownership from management and control in modern 
business corporations provides the basis for the function of agency theory, it creates the potential for conflicts of 
interests between the agents and principals and requires monitoring of the activities of the managers (the agents). 
One of the monitoring mechanisms advocated in corporate governance literature is the setting up of a monitoring 
board, but the collapse of Enron and WorldCom demonstrates the limits of a monitoring board (Deakin & 
Konzelmann, 2004).  The major predicament of agency theory, therefore, is how to align the conflicting interests 
of the managers with the interests of shareholders but when managers have incentives to manage earnings such 
as to meet or beat earnings target, performance-based compensation, etc. they are likely to manipulate the 
company’s reported earnings. This reduces the relevance and reliability of reported accounting earnings and 
financial statements generally. Davidson, Godwin-Steward and Kent (2005) observe that when managers provide 
inaccurate or false financial reporting information, they introduce earnings management as a form of agency 
costs. Agency theory, therefore, suggests monitoring mechanisms such as high quality external auditors to 
reduce these conflicts and align the interests of managers with the shareholders’ interests.   
The stakeholder perspective construes a stakeholder as “any group or individual who can influence or is 
influenced by the achievement of the organization’s objectives”(see Freeman (1984 p.52), cited in Schilling 
(2000 p.225). In the words of Clarke (2004), stakeholder theory defines the firm as multilateral agreements 
between the enterprise and its multiple stakeholders. The relationship between the company and its internal 
stakeholders (such as employees, managers and owners) is framed by formal and informal rules developed 
through the history of the relationship. While management may receive finance from shareholders, they depend 
upon employees to accomplish the productive purpose of the company. External stakeholders (customers, 
suppliers and the community) are equally important, and also constrained by formal and informal rules that 
business must respect. 
The stakeholder theory recognizes that the firm and the society are interdependent and so the firm 
serves a broader social purpose than its responsibilities to only shareholders and managers as proposed by the 
agency theory (Kiel & Nicholson, 2003). We argue, therefore, that there exists a strong linkage between earnings 
management  and the stakeholder theory since the former has the inclination to mislead the latter who rely on 
reported earnings  to take a variety of informed decisions. 
 
2.3 Review of Empirical Studies   
The debate on the relationship between audit quality and earnings management is yet to reach closure because of 
the conflicting empirical results obtained by researchers on the phenomenon of interest. While some empirical 
studies have reported the abilities of audit quality to significantly constrain earnings management (see Gul et al., 
2009; Habbash, 2010; Inaam et al., 2012), others have reported otherwise. A summary of some of these studies 
conducted from 2003 to 2014 are presented in Table 1 below. These studies utilize discretionary accruals  as 
proxies for earnings management while the ordinary least square regression model is the dominant tool for data 
analyses.  
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Table 1:  Summary of some prior studies investigating the effect of audit quality on earnings 
management from 2003 to 2014 
Author(s) & Year Proxy for Audit Quality Results 
Krishnan (2003) Specialist auditors 
Non-specialist auditors 
EM higher under non-specialist auditors 
than specialist auditors 
Balsam et al. (2003) Specialist auditors 
Non-specialist auditors 
EM higher under non-specialist auditors 
than specialist auditors 
Chen, Wu & Zhou 
(2006) 
Big 5 auditors 
Industry specialization 
Audit quality associated with less EM 
Gul et al. (2009) Specialist auditors 
Non-specialist auditors  
Negative association between auditor 
industry specialist and EM 
Habbash (2010) Specialized external auditors Specialized external auditors negatively 
associated with EM 
Gerayli et al. (2011) Auditor size 
Auditor industry specialization 
Auditor independence 
EM negatively related to audit quality 
Memis (2012) Auditor size (Big 4 auditors) Audit quality positively related to EM 
Inaam et al. (2012) Auditor industry specialization 
Auditor size (Big 4 auditors) 
Audit quality negatively associated with 
EM 
Yasar (2013) Audit firm size Positive association between audit quality 
and EM 
Pouraghajan et al. 
(2013) 
Audit firm size Positive but insignificant relationship 
between audit quality and EM 
Okolie, Izedonmi & 
Enofe (2013) 
Audit firm size 
Audit tenure 
Audit fees 
Significant negative association between 
auditor quality and EM 
Okolie (2014) Audit fees 
Audit tenure 
Significant negative association between 
audit fees and EM 
Negative association between audit tenure 
and EM 
Zhou & Guan (2014) Audit firm size 
Auditor industry specialization 
Audit firm size negatively and 
significantly associated with EM 
Positive relationship between auditor 
industry specialization and EM 
 
3. Methodology 
The correlational research design, which is used to describe the statistical relationship between two or more 
variables, is adopted for this study. It is most appropriate for this study because it allows for testing of expected 
relationships between and among variables and the making of predictions regarding such relationships. 
The population of the research comprises ten (10) oil marketing companies listed on the Nigerian Stock 
Exchange (NSE) as at 31st December, 2013. The study is focused on oil marketing companies because the oil 
industry is one of the sectors that has contributed greatly to the development of the Nigerian economy. The 
sample for the study is 8 oil marketing companies only which are selected based on availability of data for the 
study period. The sample excludes Afroil Plc because it was delisted by Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) in 2008. Another company, Beco Plc, was excluded because it was listed on the Nigerian Stock Exchange 
in 2009 (after 2004) and does not, therefore, have data from 2004 to 2008.  
This study covers a ten (10) year period (2004-2013) which coincides with  the global economic 
meltdown that adversely affected the world economy (Nigeria inclusive) and provided incentive for public 
companies to manipulate reported earnings to present impressive performance. This  period also witnessed 
unprecedented competition for fresh capital by companies listed on the NSE, a situation that could have 
motivated public companies to engage in earnings management (Bello & Yero, 2011).   
 The study used secondary data extracted from published annual reports and accounts of the sampled 
firms and the NSE fact book for the relevant years. The major tool of data analysis was multiple regression 
analysis carried out using E-views 7. 
 
3.1 Variables and their Measurement 
The dependent variable for this study is earnings management. Following a vast majority of recent studies on 
earnings management, discretionary accruals is used as a proxy for earnings management in the present study. 
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To estimate discretionary accruals, the modified cross-sectional Jones Model (Dechow, Sloan & Sweeney, 1995) 
is used because it has been widely tested and accepted by other scholars to outperform other models of 
estimating discretionary accruals (Bello & Yero, 2011). 
In using the modified Jones Model, we first compute total accruals using the cash flow statement 
approach which has been proved to be better than the balance sheet approach of computing total accruals. The 
total accruals are computed under the cash flow statement approach as shown below: 
TACCit = NIit – CFOit - - - - (1) 
where: 
TACCit = total accruals for firm i in year t 
NIit  = net income for firm i in year t 
CFOit = cash flow from operations for firm i in year t 
The second step is to estimate the parameters using ordinary least square (OLS) regression as follows: 
 
TACCit/Ait-1 = α1   1/Ait-1      +   α2 (∆REVit - ∆ARit)/Ait-1            +  α3  PPEit/Ait-1       +eit  -  -    (2) 
where 
TACCit = total accruals for firm i in year t 
Ait-1  = total assets for firm i in year t-1 
∆REVit  = change in net revenues for firm i in year t 
∆ARit  = change in accounts receivables for firm i in year t 
PPEit  = gross property, plant and equipment for firm i in year t 
eit  = error term (discretionary accruals for firm i in year t) 
α1, α2 and α3 = are firm specific parameters.  
Since the study is for one industry and time, the residuals are used directly as discretionary accruals which 
represent earnings management (see Bugshan, 2005 as cited in Bello & Yero, 2011). 
The final step is to compute discretionary accruals (DA) as shown below:  
 
DAit = TACCit/ Ait-1 – α1  1/Ait-1   +  α2  (∆REVit - ∆ARit)/Ait-1           + α3  PPEit/Ait-1      ---- (3)  
 
where DAit  is discretionary accruals while the other variables are as earlier explained above. 
Table 2 below presents a summary of all the variables (dependent, independent and control ) and their 
measurements. 
Table 2: Study Variables and their Measurement 
S/N Proxy Type Measurement  Source 
1. Discretionary 
accruals (DA) 
Dependent  Total accruals minus 
non-discretionary 
accruals 
Annual reports & Accounts 
 
 
2. Audit firm size 
(AudSIZE) 
Independent  A dummy variable 1, if 
the firm is audited by a 
Big 4 auditor, 0 
otherwise 
Annual reports & Accounts 
  
 
 
3. Auditor industry 
specialization 
(SPEC) 
Independent A dummy variable 1 if 
market size (MS) ≥10 
percent and 0 
otherwise.  
Annual reports & Accounts 
  
4. Audit firm tenure 
(TENURE) 
Independent  Number of consecutive 
years the client has 
retained a particular 
audit firm 
Annual reports & Accounts 
  
5. Company size 
(CoySIZE) 
Control  Natural log of 
company total assets 
Annual reports & Accounts 
  
6. Cash flow from 
operations (CFO) 
Control CFO divided by total 
assets at end of year t 
Annual reports & Accounts 
  
 
3.2 Specification of the Study Model 
The study uses a multiple regression model. The panel methodology is adopted since the data to be analyzed has 
panel attributes. The model is as follows: 
DAit = bO+ b1AudSIZEit + b2SPECit+ b3TENUREit+ b4CoySIZEit + b5CFOit + eit 
where: 
DAit  = Discretionary accruals 
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AudSIZEit  = Audit firm size 
SPECit  = Auditor industry specialization 
TENUREit = Audit firm tenure 
CoySIZEit = Company size 
CFOit  = Cash flow from operations 
 
4. Results and Discussion 
This section presents results and discusses major findings of the study. Descriptive statistics is discussed first, 
followed by correlation matrix, and finally the regression result. 
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics 
 DA AudSIZE SPEC TENURE CoySIZE CFO 
 Mean -16.00038  0.812500  0.600000  5.400000  17.26571  2.743493 
 Median -0.185491  1.000000  1.000000  5.000000  17.19612  0.069367 
 Maximum  2.882635  1.000000  1.000000  11.00000  22.30835  214.4535 
 Minimum -1249.850  0.000000  0.000000  1.000000  12.30953 -1.879940 
 Std. Dev.  139.7051  0.392775  0.492989  2.871069  1.474123  23.97296 
 Skewness -8.773703 -1.601282 -0.408248  0.297882  0.030887  8.771804 
 Kurtosis  77.98966  3.564103  1.166667  1.995050  6.307335  77.96787 
 Observations  80  80  80  80  80  80 
Source:  Eviews 7 Output 
From Table 3 above, the descriptive statistics results show that discretionary accruals (DA) have a mean 
value of -16.00038. This suggests very minimal DA for the sample firms during the study period as shown by the 
low magnitude of DA. The negative sign of the average DA indicates the direction of earnings management 
during the study period. The median, maximum, and minimum values of DA for the sampled firms stood at -
0.185491, 2.882635, and -1249.850 respectively. Audit firm size (AudSIZE) had a mean score of 81.25% which 
implies that about 81.25% of the sampled firms were audited by the Big 4 audit firms during the study period. 
The median, maximum, and minimum values of AudSIZE were 1.00, 1.00, and 0.00 respectively. Auditor 
industry specialization (SPEC) had a mean value of 60% signifying that 60% of the audit firms that audited the 
sampled firms during the study period possess relevant knowledge and experience in the oil marketing sector. 
The median, maximum, and minimum values were 1.00, 1.00, and 0.00 respectively. Tenure had a mean value of 
5 years which implies that on the average, the sampled companies retained their auditors for at least 5 years. The 
median, maximum, and minimum values were 5, 11, and 1 year(s) respectively. 
The first control variable, firm size (CoySIZE), had a mean value of 17.26571. The median, maximum 
and minimum values of CoySIZE were 17.19612, 22.30835 and 12.30953 respectively.  The second control 
variable, cash flow from operations (CFO), had a mean of 2.743493. The median, maximum and minimum value 
of CFO was 0.069367, 214.4535 and -1.879940 respectively. The Skewness for all the variables was very close 
to 1 except DA and CFO which had very high values. Similarly, the Kurtosis values for DA and CFO were very 
high, followed by COYSIZE and AUDSIZE. The high values of Skewness and kurtosis signify the presence of 
outliers in the data set which was resolved through data transformation. The transformation of data was 
necessary to take care of outliers (see Table 3 for the high kurtosis and skewness for some variables) in the data 
that could produce spurious regression results.  
Table 4: Correlation Matrix 
      
      Correlation SPEC  TENURE  AudSIZE  CoySIZE  CFO  
SPEC  1.000000     
TENURE  -0.288704 1.000000    
AudSIZE  -0.196116 0.270561 1.000000   
CoySIZE  -0.027362 0.281939 -0.078541 1.000000  
CFO  -0.032087 -0.031123 -0.128189 -0.293001 1.000000 
      
      Source:  Eviews 7 Output 
Table 4 above shows the relationship between the regressors in the study model. The result shows that 
the independent and control variables are fairly correlated with each other. None of the correlation coefficients in 
the table above is greater than 0.8 (rule of the thumb), suggesting that there may be no problem of 
multicollinearity in the explanatory variables. However, to further confirm non existence of multicollinearity 
problem in the data, variance inflation factor (VIF) was computed. The result (see Table 5) reveals that 
multicollinearity may not pose a problem to the regression analysis as all VIF values were consistently lower 
than 10. 
The result of the regression analysis is presented in the table below: 
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Table 5: Regression Result (Random Effect Model) 
      
     
 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   VIF 
      
      C -23.12434 6.717817 -3.442241 0.0010  
AudSIZE -0.490525 0.634504 -0.773084 0.4419  1.289490 
SPEC -0.364426 0.345360 -1.055206 0.2948  1.168423 
TENURE -0.547621 0.295477 -1.853346 0.0578  1.113532 
CoySIZE 8.410068 2.396009 3.510033 0.0008  1.249650 
CFO 0.250696 0.109410 2.291340 0.0248  1.139105 
R-squared 0.197915   
Adjusted R-squared 0.143720   
S.E. of regression 1.383523   
F-statistic 3.651905   
Prob(F-statistic) 0.005231     
Durbin-Watson stat 1.947789     
      
      Source:  Eviews 7 Output 
Table 5 above presents the summary of regression results of the dependent variable (DA) and the 
independent variable, audit quality (represented by audit firm size, auditor industry specialization, and auditor 
tenure). The result of Hausman specification test indicates that the random effect model is most appropriate for 
the data.  The result shows that the model is fit for estimation and the explanatory variables are properly selected, 
combined, and used. This can be confirmed by the value of F-statistics of 3.65 (p=0.00) significant at 1% level 
of significance. This implies that the explanatory variables included in the model of the study are sufficient to 
explain the relationship between audit quality and earnings management (proxy by discretionary accruals) of 
listed oil marketing companies in Nigeria. The coefficient of determination (R2) is 19.79%. This shows that 
19.79% of variation in the dependent variable is jointly explained by the explanatory variables specified in the 
study model. Though the R2 is low, it does not pose a problem to the study because the F-statistics value of the 
model is significant at 1%. The Durbin-Watson statistics of 1.95 (approximately 2) implies absence of auto-
correlation problem within the study period. 
The result of regression analysis shows that audit firm size (AudSIZE) has a negative (-0.49) but 
insignificant (p-value=0.44) relationship with discretionary accruals (proxy for earnings management) of the 
sampled oil marketing companies listed on the NSE during the study period. The possible reason for the negative 
relationship is because large audit firms (represented by Big 4) have more investment in reputation capital than 
small audit firms (non-Big 4). Secondly, large audit firms have a large client base than small audit firms that 
makes them less dependent on any one of them (DeAngelo, 1981). Consequently, clients of Big 4 audit firms are 
likely to be associated with less earnings management and hence the negative relationship in this study. The 
study concludes that audit firm size has no significant impact on earnings management of listed oil marketing 
companies in Nigeria during the study period. The present finding is consistent with findings of  Chen et al. 
(2006), Gerayli et al. (2011), Inaam et al. (2012),  Zhou and Guan (2014), and Okolie et al. (2014) but 
contradicts the previous findings by Pouraghajan et al. (2013) and Yasar (2013) who document a positive 
association between audit firm size and discretionary accruals. 
Table 5 above also reveals a negative (-0.36) but insignificant (p-value=0.2948) relationship between 
auditor industry specialization (SPEC) and discretionary accruals (DA) of oil marketing companies listed on the 
NSE. The negative association is because industry specialist auditors possess relevant industry specific 
knowledge and experience that non- industry specialist auditors do not have. Secondly, industry specialist 
auditors invest in Information Technology (IT) relevant to their clients. The relevant experiences of specialist 
auditors make them to easily detect accounting irregularities and errors in a client accounting system than non-
specialist auditors. This present finding collaborates prior findings by Balsam et al. (2003), Krishnam (2003), 
Habbash (2010), Gerayli et al. (2011), Inaam et al. (2012), and Ahmadzade et al. (2012) who document a 
negative association between SPEC and earnings management. The present finding however, contradicts the 
finding by Zhou and Guan (2014) who found a positive relationship between auditor industry specialization and 
discretionary accruals of Chinese firms. With the above evidence, the study concludes that SPEC has no 
significant impact on earnings management of listed oil marketing companies in Nigeria during the study period. 
Similarly, Table 5 shows a negative (-0.55) and significant association (p-value=0.0578 at 10% level) 
between auditor tenure and discretionary accruals of the sampled oil marketing companies listed on the NSE. 
The possible explanation for the negative relationship is that the knowledge of the auditor of a client’s 
accounting system increases with long tenure. Consequently, the auditor becomes more efficient in detecting 
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accounting irregularities of the client than he was at the beginning of the audit engagement. The negative 
relationship is therefore expected. The present result is consistent with Ahmadzade et al. (2012), Okolie et al. 
(2013), and Okolie (2014) who document negative association between auditor tenure and discretionary accruals. 
The empirical evidence supports the rejection of the null hypothesis that TENURE has no significant impact on 
earnings management of listed oil marketing companies in Nigeria.   
Table 5 above also indicates that the control variables, company size and cash flow from operations 
have a significant positive relationship with earnings management. This implies that company size and cash flow 
from operations did not constrain earnings management of listed oil marketing companies in Nigeria during the 
study period. 
 
5.0 Conclusion and Recommendations 
This study examines the impact of audit quality (audit firm size, auditor industry specialization and auditor 
tenure) on earnings management of listed oil marketing companies in Nigeria for the period 2004-2013. Earnings 
management was represented by discretionary accruals estimated by the modified Jones Model. Secondary data 
were extracted from the annual reports of 8 listed oil marketing companies that form the sample of the study and 
analyzed using multiple regression analysis. The results reveal that both audit firm size and auditor industry 
specialization have negative but insignificant impact on EM of the sampled oil marketing companies during the 
study period. Auditor tenure has a significant negative impact on EM of the sampled oil marketing companies 
listed on the NSE which is consistent with our apriori expectations.  The study recommends the removal of the 
restriction placed on the tenure of external auditors to a maximum of nine (9) consecutive years  since longer 
auditor tenures are likely to  constrain earnings management practices of listed companies in Nigeria.   
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